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RESUMO 
A questão dos universais permanece tema na filosofia tanto na ontologia como na epistemologia. 
Em Husserl, há universais particulares, o ‘X’ noemático, o idêntico, e universais stricto sensu, 
nomes universais atemporais. Neste artigo, apresento o tema conforme analisado por Husserl em 
Ideias I. Na primeira seção, descrevo a trajetória até os universais destacando o paralelismo entre 
noese e noema. Na segunda seção, traço o reflexo para a filosofia da linguagem também afetada 
pela correspondência noético-noemática. Na terceira e última seção, mostro como a investigação 
sobre os universais move-se apenas na esfera noemática, e concluo defendendo a possibilidade de 
partindo do ‘X’ noemático alcançar o universal em sentido estrito. 
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ABSTRACT 
The problem of universals remains a philosophical theme not only in ontology but also in 
epistemology. In Husserl, there are particular universals, the noematic ‘X’, the identical, and 
universals stricto sensu, atemporal universal names. In this paper, I present the theme as it is 
analyzed by Husserl in Ideas I. In the first section, I describe the trajectory to the universals 
highlighting the parallelism between noese and noema. In the second section, I draw the 
reflection of this problem on the philosophy of language which is also affected by the noetic-
noematic correspondence. In the third and last section, I show how the investigation about the 
universals moves in the noematic sphere, and conclude defending the possibility of reaching 
the universal strict sense departing from the noematic ‘X’.  
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INTRODUÇÃO 
This paper is a study about the 
universals in Ideias I. The term, in 
German, is ‘Allgemeinheit’ and has 
been translated to ‘universality’ in the 
English edition of F. Kersten and in 
the Spanish edition of J. Gaos. In the 
Brazilian-Portuguese edition of M. 
Suzuki it has been translated to 
‘generalization’. I use the English 
translation considering it more 
accurate to the meaning given by 
Husserl and I hope that at the end of 
this paper the reason for this option is 
clearer.  
Initially, I will highlight a few 
relevant concepts, the eidetic 
parallelism between noetic and 
noematic, the path to §124 entitled 
‘The Noetic-Noematic Stratum of 
“Logos”, and ‘Signifying and 
Signification’, where Husserl presents 
different definitions of universality. 
From this point, I will focus the study 
on the idea of universals as 
“universals names”, to wit, universals 
stricto sensu. In the next section, I will 
emphasize how the parallelism 
between noetic and noematic also 
echos in language and show a few 
difficulties and possibilities for 
reaching the universals and their 
signification.  In the third and last 
section, I will explain how the path to 
the universals is given in the 
noematic sphere and how through the 
universal given in the lived event, the 
noematic ‘X’, it is possible to raise 
consciousness to the universal stricto 
sensu.  
 
 
1. TO THE UNIVERSALS   
Husserl defines phenomenology as a 
descriptive science (§71), therefore 
establishes its object of knowledge 
and method. The objects of its 
knowledge are the essences of mental 
processes [die Erlebnisse] 3 . The 
method is neither that of the natural 
sciences nor that of other eidetic 
descriptive sciences, such as 
                                                        
3 TRANSLATION NOTE: I would not 
translate ‘die Erlebnisse’ to ‘mental 
processes’. Das Erlebnis is a 
remarkable event that someone has 
experienced, or has lived. It refers to 
the whole experience of living a 
specific event. When you translate to 
‘mental processes’, it seems that the 
emphasis is on the consciousness acts 
(noese), but ‘das Erlebnis’ is not only 
about them, it is also about the content 
of these acts (noema), and more, is 
about the eidetic relation between 
them (the noetic-noematic relation). 
Therefore, I think the Brazilian-
Portuguese translation is better; it is 
translated to ‘lived’ (vivido) to indicate 
an event experienced or lived, in 
shorten, a ‘lived event’ that now is 
under focus.  
Aoristo))))) 
International Journal of Phenomenology, Hermeneutics and Metaphysics 
  
 
 
 
 
Um estudo sobre os universais em Ideias I 
25 
geometry (§§72-74). The 
phenomenological method is unique 
and through reduction (§76) unveils 
the realm of transcendental 
consciousness as primal category of 
“absolute” being. In turn, the doctrine 
of categories must set off from this 
radical ontological specificity, the 
distinction between consciousness 
and transcendent, transcendental and 
transcendent.  
From this distinction the 
phenomenological reflection moves 
entirely in the transcendental 
dimension through acts of reflection 
(§77). The object, or the content, of 
these acts of reflection is any mental 
process, or considering our 
translation, any lived event 4 . When 
the lived event is noticed, when a 
reflection is directed to it, it becomes 
an object to the Ego, to the 
phenomenologist (§78).  
The interest of the 
phenomenologist is about a very 
specific part of the lived event5 , its 
essence. This part is only revealed 
when the phenomenological 
reduction is applied, and the findings 
bracketed become outstanding 
examples of universality of essences. 
The path is as follows: at first sight, 
                                                        
4 See note #1. 
5 From now on, I will adopt the 
Brazilian-portuguese translation. ‘Das 
Erlebnis’ is translated to ‘the lived 
event’. See note #1. 
there is the non-reflecting lived event; 
then there is a modification of 
consciousness, one becomes aware of 
the lived event and starts to reflect on 
it; the lived event becomes, then, a 
reflected lived event. There are 
various reflection acts that cross a 
lived event, the immanent eidetic 
seizing, the immanent experiencing, 
the remembrance of something that 
has been perceived, or the expectation 
of something that will become 
perceived. These modifications 
belong to each lived event as possible 
ideal variations, ideal operations,    
reiterable modifications ad infinitum. 
Conversely, only through reflexive 
acts of experience, can we learn 
something about the continuously 
flowing and the necessary reference 
to the Ego, one and the same self, 
precisely because one can “look” at 
the whole flowing of lived events 
(§§78-80).  
This flowing of lived events that 
belongs to an Ego reveals a 
continuous and endless temporality. 
This complex of lived events is given 
in this temporality, before, after and 
simultaneously, in a continuous 
progression of apprehensions, one 
after another, and the Ego is given 
absolutely and undoubtedly as an 
idea, in the Kantian sense (§§81-83). 
The lived event given to a pure I 
is composed of a noetic dimension, 
consciousness acts, and a noematic 
dimension, the content of these acts.  
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Thus, there is a perceiving act and the 
perceived as such; a remembering act 
and the remembered as such; the 
judging act and the judged as such. 
Put another way, the lived event is 
composed of intentionality, 
consciousness acts, the noetic, and 
what is intentioned, the 
correspondent content of these acts, 
the noematic. These contents can be 
understood as real components of 
lived events or non-real – ideal – 
components of lived events, which 
can be called sense (§§88-89).  
       The sense is immanently in 
the lived event of perceiving, of 
remembering and of judging, this is 
the idea that phenomenology 
intends to reach and describe. To 
describe an idea is not to describe 
thought, but to describe an essence, 
an eidos. The core of the description 
is the eidetic as given, to describe 
the perception in its noematic 
perspective. In other words, the 
focus is not on the consciousness 
acts as in Logical Investigations. In 
Ideas I, what we are trying to 
describe are the core of the contents, 
the essences. In Husserl’s words:   
 
Everything which is purely 
immanent and reduced in the way 
peculiar to the mental process, 
everything which cannot be 
conceived apart from it just as it is 
in itself, and which eo ipso passes 
over into the Eidos in the eidetic 
attitude, is separated by an abyss 
from all of Nature and physics and 
no less from all psychology – and 
even this image, as naturalistic, is 
not strong enough to indicate the 
difference. (HUA 3, 184). 
 
Therefore, all intentionally lived 
events have intentional objects, 
namely, their objective sense (§90-91). 
The difficulty is in maintaining 
attention on the parenthesized 
effective object given in the lived 
event and not allowing consciousness 
to divert to the real object, to the thing 
outside. This is because, although 
phenomenology admits the existence 
of real and transcendent things, it 
takes them as components of the 
phenomenon, as elements contained 
in the reduced phenomenon, not as 
objects of knowledge. (Drummond, 
1945, p.229) 
Even if there are attentional 
changes and it is possible to privilege 
different aspects of the lived event, 
the noematic core remains identical 
(§92). It is also possible to admit 
changes on the noema, since different 
modes of alteration to the lived event 
are possible. Although, in the full 
noema, the manifold modes gather in 
a central core, “meant Objectivity as 
Objectivity”. All these changes are 
possible because, despite the fact that 
the attentional modes are subjective, 
the object struck by an Ego-ray is 
independent, given only to the Ego, 
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but it is not “subjective” (§93). 
Husserl asserts: 
 
It is then a further undertaking of 
more precise phenomenological 
study to discover what is 
prescribed according to eidetic law 
precisely by species, and what is so 
prescribed by the differentiating 
particularities, for noemata of 
changing particularities of a fixed 
species (e.g., perception). But the 
restriction holds throughout: in the 
sphere of essences there is nothing 
accidental; everything is connected 
by eidetic relations, thus especially 
noesis and noema. (HUA 3, 
193/194) 
 
These attentional modes reach 
the noema and do not cause any 
alteration on the identical noematic 
core. Another way to put it is to say 
that the ray of attention does not 
separate from the self, it is and 
remains a ray of the Ego, and the 
“object” is reached, is target, given 
only in reference to the Ego, but it is 
not “subjective” (§92).  
Thus, we can infer that on both 
lower-level noeses such as sensitive 
perceptions, and on higher-level 
noeses such as moral judgments, 
composition appears on the noematic 
as a central core, something made 
conscious, as, under the designation 
of sense.  A phenomenological study 
aims to demonstrate in such species 
of noema what is required by the 
species itself and what is required by 
the particularities of a fixed species. 
This is because, in the sphere of 
essences, in the study of the central 
core of noema, there is no 
contingency, it being necessary to 
differentiate what is required by the 
species from what is demanded by 
the particularization (§93). 
In other words, in apperceiving 
the lived event, reduction reveals the 
relation between real – hyletic and 
noetic – and non-real or ideal – 
noematic. In the example offered by 
Husserl, a sensory lived event, the 
sensitive perception of a tree is given: 
on one side, there is the actual unity 
of the lived, the color of the trunk of 
the tree, color as sensitive stimulus, 
sensation of color; on the other, there 
is the unity of the noema, the 
continuous unity of a variable 
perceptual consciousness, the same 
identical color in itself immutable. 
The real unity of the lived event is 
composed of hyletic and noetic 
elements; it is the unity that reveals 
the individual as the same, material, 
concrete, which allows me to say “I 
see the same tree”. The unity of the 
ideal is the unity of the noema which 
reveals the post-reduction essence 
(§97).  
There is also a third unity, the 
noetic-noematic unity, which binds 
that object to a certain essence. In the 
post-reduction mode, the eidos of the 
noema points to the eidos of the noetic 
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consciousness, that is, they are 
eidetically interdependent, although 
they are independent.  
An issue arises: since noematic 
“objects” are evidently units brought 
to consciousness in the lived event, 
but transcendent in relation to it, how 
can we elucidate the relation between 
the real composition of the lived 
event and what is in consciousness as 
ideal, as essence? (§102) 
The intentional object as such 
appears as support to all noematic 
characters. All noematic characters 
suggested have a universal 
phenomenological scope, they 
constitute the necessary foundations 
of all intentional lived events, the 
same fundamental genera and species 
of characteristics are also found 
among all these founded lived events, 
and therefore, in general, in all these 
intentional lived events. 
Corresponding to the noematic 
characters, also called modes of being, 
there are noetic characters (§103), for 
example, certainty corresponds to 
perceptual belief, possible to 
assumption, plausible to conjecture, 
problematic to questioning, doubtful 
to doubt, denial to rejection, 
affirmation to assent (§§103-108). 
Aside from the modifications related 
to the sphere of belief, there is a 
consciousness mode entirely 
particular, neutrality (§109). 
Neutrality is a modification in the 
sphere of belief that does not operate, 
does not scratch, does not emphasize, 
it refrains from operating, abstains 
from producing, puts out of action, 
parenthesizes, leaves undecided. The 
character of position is in suspense. 
Belief, conjecture, denial, and other 
noetic characters are neutralized and 
the correlates are for consciousness, 
not in the actual mode, but “mere 
thinking of”.  
Neutrality and positing are 
opposing attitudes, yet 
complementary (§110). They are 
opposing attitudes because positing is 
positional, evaluates with reason, 
may be correct or not; neutrality or 
suspension is not positional, cannot 
be evaluated with reason, cannot be 
neither correct nor incorrect. In 
addition, various positions potentially 
included in it can be taken from 
effective consciousness, effective 
positions; on the other hand, neutral 
consciousness does not contain any 
“real” predicate. They are 
complementary because all lived 
events ideally correspond to a 
neutralization mode. Hence, there are 
two fundamental possibilities of 
realizing consciousness within the 
cogito: the effective, positional, 
authentic cogito, and the shadow, 
non-effective, non-positional, 
inauthentic cogito. It happens that the 
effective operation and the neutral 
modification correspond and yet they 
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do not share the same essence 
because when positional actuality is 
neutralized it becomes potentiality 
(§§113-114). Put another way, all 
perception has its background of 
perception and this is a unit of 
potential positions. The background 
leads to perspective changes and 
potential "seizures". Or else, in the 
essence of all lived events is outlined 
beforehand a set of potential positions 
of being.  
Hence it is possible to identify 
several intentional domains, one can 
differentiate incipient or non-effected 
acts from actual acts, among these 
there are neutrality and positionality, 
and among this there are actual and 
potential positions. And, even in the 
face of so many variables, the 
parallelism between noese and noema 
remains under all intentional 
domains (§115).  
Up to this point, Husserl adopts 
examples of simple noeses, acts of 
perception. From then on, he turns his 
attention to noeses of feeling, of 
desiring, of willing (§§116-117). It 
may seem a deviation in reasoning, 
but it is within the framework of 
affective consciousness that Husserl 
makes an evident passage from 
particular to universal.  
To these new noetic moments 
correspond a new dimension of sense, 
new noematic moments: values. 
Values are not determining parts of 
things, but values of things. That is to 
say, in the affective consciousness, the 
higher level noema - value - is a core 
of sense surrounded by new posited 
characters. In other words, things 
have no value, but support value, and 
consciousness, in turn, consciousness 
is of possible value, or else, only 
things are supposed to be valuable. 
Thus, apprehensions of value relate to 
apprehensions of things in the same 
way that the new noematic 
characterizations (beauty and 
ugliness, goodness and badness) 
relate to modes of belief.  
In affective consciousness, 
positional affective, contents 
correspond to acts, therefore, to acts 
of pleasure, desire, valuation, acts of 
will in general, correspond positional 
characters. To these positional 
characters lies an archontic positing 
that unifies in itself and governs all 
others, the supreme unity of species, 
the universality of essence. Thus the 
analogy between universal logic, 
universal theory of value, and ethics. 
These lead to the constitution of 
formal universal formal parallel: 
formal logic, formal axiology, and 
theory of practice. 
This is only possible because 
every thesis is subject to an eidetic 
law: any thesis, of whatever species 
(including affective), can be 
transformed into an actual doxic 
position. Therefore, any proposition 
(including desire) can be transformed 
into a doxic proposition. It is as if in 
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all the positional characters 
(including valuations) doxic 
modalities were kept. Consequently, 
every act or every correlate of act 
takes on a logical aspect and can be 
explained logically thanks to the 
universality of essence. Otherwise, all 
acts in general (including acts of 
affection and will) are potentially 
objectifying. 
A new question arises, how can 
we promote this unity once lived 
events and the acts of consciousness 
distend in time (§118)? These lived 
events and their acts must be unified 
in syntheses, synthesized by 
consciousness. Husserl identifies two 
types of synthesis, articulated 
synthesis and continuous synthesis. 
In articulated syntheses, acts are 
linked in an act of higher order. In 
continuous synthesis, unity belongs 
to the same level of ordination; there 
is no act of higher order unifying 
them. 
Considering the articulated 
syntheses of lived events, the 
possibility is evident of transforming 
what one is aware of from many acts 
(polythetic) into something that one is 
simply conscious of because of a 
single act (nomothetic) (§119). Thus 
every noese contributes to the 
constitution of a total object, or else, 
every consciousness in synthetic 
unity has a total object. In a simpler 
way, a lived event is made up of 
multiple acts and each act 
corresponds to a noema. To unify a 
lived event is to realize an articulated 
synthesis, to identify an act of higher 
order and its corresponding synthetic 
object, a total object. Or, to intuit a 
total object implies a specific act of 
consciousness, since the ideal unity of 
the object could not be intuited by a 
dispersed multiplicity of particular 
acts. (Moreland, 2001, p. 44) 
 A synthesis depends on the 
character of the noeses, if all 
subtheses are positional, it is 
positional; if one is neutral, it is 
neutral. Thus, from the positional 
noeses, an articulated synthesis is 
carried out step by step. Position, 
apposition, presupposition, 
postposition etc. compose an 
articulated synthesis. It must be 
remembered that these noeses are 
radiations of an Ego as a source of 
original productions (§122). It is an 
active Ego. Every thesis begins with a 
point of initiation (fiat), a first 
spontaneous act, for example, 
deciding or volunteering. Every act 
can begin in this mode of spontaneity, 
a creative act, in which the self makes 
its entrance as subject of spontaneity 
in a new flow of lived events. 
This mode of initiation passes 
through an eidetic need, a modal 
change. This modal change does not 
imply losing all that has been 
previously apprehended, no synthetic
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step is abandoned, but the mode of 
actuality essentially changes with a 
new actual thematic of origin. This is 
because to every actual noetic change 
corresponds a noematic change. 
However, despite the necessary 
changes of the noematic mode, the 
essence always remains the same.  
Having established these 
premises, Husserl approaches the 
subject from another perspective, that 
of language.  
 
 
1. UNIVERSALS AS 
THEME OF PHILOSOPHY OF 
LANGUAGE AND ITS 
DIFFICULTIES  
In dealing with affective 
consciousness, Husserl had already 
stated that any proposition could be 
transformed into a doxic proposition 
(§117). It is from this "translation" of 
non-doxic proposition into doxic 
proposition that one can explain the 
universality of predicative judgments 
and the necessity of formal and 
material noetic disciplines, or 
noematic and ontological (§118).  
These disciplines are developed 
from the articulated syntheses that 
transform polythetical acts into 
nomothetical acts, such as, collecting, 
disjunctive, explicating and relating. 
The whole series of syntheses 
determine the formal-ontological 
forms according to the pure forms of 
the synthetical objectivities being 
constituted in them and, with respect 
to the structure of noematic formation 
are mirrored in the apophantic 
significational forms belonging to 
formal logic. Simply put, the 
articulated syntheses bind acts in a 
unit and to the nomothetic act 
corresponds a total object. Therefore, 
to the formal-ontological forms - 
noetic structure - a noematic structure 
corresponds that, in turn, implies 
apophantic forms of signifying the 
formal logic. Put differently, every 
process of synthesis that affects the 
acts and their content, the noetic-
noematic relationship, has a 
corresponding one in language, that 
is, in formal logic understood as 
apophantic, as propositional logic.  
In logic, this correspondence is 
evident by the law of nominalization 
(§119) according to which every 
proposition and every partial form 
distinguishable in the proposition 
corresponds to a nominal character. 
Nominalization is the logical-formal 
counterpart of the transformation of a 
polythetical act into a nomothetic act 
so that this named unit can serve as 
the subject of an affirmation. Husserl 
gives as an example the judgment 
expressed in 'S is p' where 'S is p' can 
be transformed into the subject of an 
affirmation, "that 'S is p' is positive." 
Husserl draws a parallelism 
between all the layers described so far 
and the layers of acts of expression, 
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logical in the apophantic sense, which 
are also affected by the relation 
between noese and noema. Hence the 
noetic-noematic relationship also has 
repercussions on expression and 
signification (§124). 
This parallelism implies an 
amplification of the understanding 
about the act of signifying and 
signification. Before, they referred 
only to the linguistic sphere, the 
expression, but Husserl proposes its 
extension to be applied in every 
noetic-noematic sphere, whether 
intertwined with expressive acts or 
not. 
The example is the following: 
we perceive an object already put 
nomothetically, "this is white". This 
process does not require expression; it 
is a perceptive act that does not 
depend on expression or 
verbalization. If, however, we 
verbalize, "this is white", then we 
have a new expressive layer superior 
to the noematic layer of "meant as 
meant". This process applies also to 
other acts such as remember and 
fantasize. 
Thus, we have the following 
maxim: anything ‘meant as meant’ 
considered in the noematic sense of 
any act is expressible through logical 
significations. Quoting Husserl: 
 
The verbal sound can only be called 
an expression because the 
signification belonging to it 
expresses; expressing inheres in it 
originaliter. “Expression” is a 
distinctive form which allows for 
adapting to every “sense” (to the 
noematic “core”) and raises it to the 
realm of “Logos”, of the conceptual 
and, on that account, the 
“universal”. [HUA 3, 257] 
 
In the noetic dimension, 
expressing is an act to which all other 
acts must conform and combine so 
that all acts of noematic sense, and 
consequently the reference to 
objectivity, are conceptually stamped 
on the noematic correlate of the 
expression.  
In short, on the lived event there 
is, on one side, a real dimension that 
includes the hyletic and the noetic, on 
other side, an ideal dimension, the 
noematic (§97). At first, we live the 
perception, 'this is white', 'this is a 
tree'. Then, we can verbalize this lived 
event. Remembering that the 
expressive act is also affected by the 
noetic-noematic relationship, it is 
easily understood that, in its noetic 
dimension, its expressive act 
combines several other acts, but with 
the same noematic signification. 
This layer of expression 
produced from previous layers brings 
up some problems. Once all science is 
objectified through "logic" in the 
sense of apophantic, in the midst of 
expression, the problems of 
expression and signification are 
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immediately presented to the 
philosopher. Some difficulties are: 
how to understand the "expression" 
of the "expressed", how expressive 
lived events relate to non-expressive 
ones and what the intervention of the 
expression entails for the latter? What 
is the eidetic nexus between the layer 
of expressive signification and the 
layer of what is expressed? 
Despite giving expression to all 
other intentionalities, the expressive 
layer is not productive, or its 
performance in noematic terms is 
exhausted in the expression and in 
the conceptual form. The expressive 
layer is, in essence, perfectly in 
accordance with the layer that 
receives the expression accepting the 
essence of this. For this reason it is 
called representation. In further 
words, the expression is a spiritual 
formation that exerts new intentional 
functions in the previous intentional 
layer and from it receives 
correspondingly intentional 
functions. This correspondence 
between the non-expressive layer and 
the expressive layer is such that when 
the non-expressive layer is positional 
or neutral, the expressive layer 
follows it entirely in its mode. 
It is in this context that Husserl 
presents different definitions of 
universality [Allgemeinheit].  
 
Of particular importance is the 
understanding of the different sorts 
of “universality” which make their 
appearance there: on the one side, 
those which belong to each 
expression and moment of 
expression, also to the non-
selfsufficient “is”, “not”, “and”, 
“if”, and so forth; on the other side, 
the universality of “universal 
names” such as “human being” in 
contrast to proper names such as 
“Bruno;” again, those which belong 
to an essence which, in itself, is 
syntactically formless in 
comparison to the different 
universalities of signification just 
touched upon. [HUA 3, 259] 
 
In order to understand these 
different definitions one has to 
understand the different modes of 
actuality (§125), or different 
modalities of performing the act 
considering the layer of signification 
(logic) and the lower founding layer 
(the expressed). There are two 
possible levels of confusion: first, the 
relation between the expressive 
(logical) layer and the lower layer (the 
expressed), in this case the lower 
layer may be a confusing unit (and 
most often it is), or the adjustment 
between the layer of what is 
expressed and the layer of logical 
expression is not precise; secondly, 
the relation between the proposition 
expressed and the ones that follow, 
when the former ceases to be a theme 
and it is overcome by the following, 
for example, when we are reading, 
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we can articulate and freely effect 
each signification and synthetically 
connect significations. 
The impact of these difficulties 
on the method of clarification is 
highly relevant, since the need to 
move from confused thinking to 
completely explicit knowledge and to 
clarified and distinctive acts of 
thinking is evident. That is to say, all 
logical acts (acts of signification) need 
to be converted into precise acts by 
establishing a full logical distinction. 
And, because of the correlation 
between the noetic and noematic 
dimension, something similar must 
also be operated in the founding 
lower layer, “everywhere unliving is to 
be converted into the living, all confusion 
into distinctness, but also all non-
intuitiveness into intuitiveness”. [HUA 
3, 260] Only when we perform this 
work “of conversion” made in the 
substractum, does the method of 
clarification come into action. 
Another difficulty level is the 
difference between the complete and 
incomplete expression (§126). There is 
a unity between what is expressed 
and what expresses; however, it 
explains that the upper layer that 
expresses does not have to extend 
through the entire layer of what is 
expressed. There does not need to be 
a perfect match between what is 
expressed and expression. The 
expression is complete if it marks all 
the synthetic forms and materials of 
the lower layer, is incomplete if it 
only does it partially. 
There is, however, an inevitable 
incompleteness that is part of the 
essence of expression as such, that is, 
of its universality. This implies that it 
is contained in the sense of 
universality, inherent to the essence 
of the expression, that all the 
particularities of the expressed can 
never be reflected in the expression. 
The expression layer is not a copy of 
the layer of what is expressed, not all 
dimensions of this layer are covered 
in the expression. Even in the 
particular sense of a term there 
remain essential differences as to how 
forms and synthetic materials find 
expression. 
One more difficulty is the need 
to complement all significations, 
forms of signification and 
“syncategorematic” significations. 
The expressions alone are 
understandable, but still lack 
complement. The question is what 
does this need for complement of 
significations imply and how does it 
affect both layers. 
For Husserl, all these points can 
be clarified if it is explained “how 
statings as the expressions of judging are 
related to the expressing of other sorts of 
acts.” [HUA 3, 262]. There are 
proposition forms structured in a 
peculiar way, interrogative 
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propositions, presumption-
propositions, optative propositions, 
imperative propositions, etc., but 
interpretable dubiously. Questions 
arise, do these expressions have a 
kind of signification of their own, or 
are they actually propositions of 
statements?  
Thought over the theme 
considering only the noetic 
dimension is insufficient. It is 
necessary to consider the noematic 
dimension to which the acts of 
signification are directed. This, then, 
is the radical problem: 
 
 “Is the medium of expressive 
signifying, this appertinent 
medium of the Logos, a specifically 
doxic one? In the adaptation of the 
signifying to the signified, does it 
not coincide with doxic itself 
inherent in all positionality?” 
[HUA 3, 263] 
 
A doxic expression, to be 
faithful and complete, to express 
straightforwardly a lived event, for 
example, affective, could only 
correspond to doxic lived events non-
modalized, that is, could only express 
certainties. If I am not sure when I 
wish, then it is not correct if in direct 
adjustment I say, "May S be p." This is 
because expressing is not merely 
verbalizing, but signifying, a doxic act 
in strong sense that expresses a 
certainty of belief. 
But, if modalities happen, 
"Maybe S can be p", then one can try 
to adjust the expression as much as 
possible. However, in this case there 
is a deviation. Such deviations are 
possible because several possibilities 
of explanation are the essence of all 
objectivity. The expression is not then 
adjusted to the original phenomenon, 
but directly to the predicative 
phenomenon derived from it. 
Husserl makes one more 
warning; the eidetic clarification of 
the idea of doxa is not the same thing 
as clarification of statements or 
explanations. 
 
2. FROM NOEMATIC ‘X’ 
TO THE UNIVERSALS  
In the above quotation, Husserl 
presents different definitions of 
universal; the definition that we 
intend to deepen is the one of 
universals as "universal names". The 
investigation of the universals opens 
on both sides, noetic and noematic, 
but the search for universal names, 
strictly universal, occurs in the 
noematic dimension. This is because, 
to a large extent, what has been taken 
by analyzing the acts was entirely 
obtained by directing the gaze to the 
"meant as meant", and thus, it is 
intended to describe noematic 
structures. In other words, given 
eidetic parallelism between noesis 
and noema that permeates all modes 
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of consciousness; the investigation of 
universality of the noesis is only 
complete when accompanied by the 
search for the universality of the 
noema. The objective is to direct 
attention to the universal structure of 
the noema. The phenomenological 
problem of the reference of 
consciousness to objectivity has, first 
and foremost, its noematic side. 
For Husserl, there is a universal 
noematic structure in which a certain 
noematic "core" separates from the 
mutable "characters" belonging to it 
(§129). The relation takes place in the 
following way: every noema has a 
content, that is, a signifying, and 
refers through it to "its" object. That is 
to say, an intentional lived event has 
"reference to the object," but it is also 
"consciousness of something." 
However, the reference to the object 
cannot be the same as the one desired 
when speaking of intentional 
reference, since each noetic moment 
corresponds to a moment of the 
noema. So, how to find "the same", 
the identity of the noema, its central 
point, or else, the support to noematic 
properties? 
An “objectivity” is part of the 
noema, an essence that is immune to 
modifications (§130). The goal, 
therefore, is the description of the 
"object as intended", the “meant 
objective something, as it is meant”, 
avoiding all "subjective" expressions. 
In this description, formal-ontological 
expressions are used, such as "object", 
"determination", "state of affairs"; 
material-ontological expressions such 
as "physical thing", "bodily figure", 
"cause"; determinations such as 
"hard", "rough", "colored". All of them 
under inverted commas, accordingly 
the noematic-modified sense. Thus, 
through conceptual explanation and 
apprehension we obtain a closed set 
of formal or material predicates that 
determine the "content" of the 
objective core of the noema. 
It is important, however, to 
point out that these predicates are 
predicates of 'something', an identical 
intentional object, a pure 'x', the 
central noematic moment, a single 
object, and such predicates are 
unthinkable without this support 
(§131). The predicates are oscillating 
and variable, but the central point of 
the intentional object is the same, 
nothing contingent. Hence the object 
is brought to consciousness as 
identical and yet in different noematic 
modes. 
To each of the various noemas 
correspond acts with different 
nucleus, but in such a way that they 
come together in a unity of identity, 
in a unity in which the "something", 
the determinable that is contained in 
each nucleus, is brought to 
consciousness as identical. And, just 
as separate acts can come together in 
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a "concordant" unity; the "something" 
of the separate nucleus is brought to 
consciousness as being the same 
something, the same 'X', the same 
object. 
Husserl, then, establishes a 
possible difference between this 
noematic core and sense. The 
intentional object receives two 
definitions, first, it is the pure point of 
unity, that noematic object purely and 
simply given; secondly, is the 'how' of 
its determinations, including its 
indeterminacy, is a noematic object in 
the 'how' of its modes of givenness 
(§132). Therefore, sense is a 
fundamental part of the noema, but it 
is not the core. Every sense has not 
only "its object", but different senses 
refer to the same object. Therefore, 
sense is not a concrete essence of the 
noema, but a kind of abstract form 
intrinsic to it. 
However, there may be a 
coincidence between the sense and 
the core. Husserl refers to sense in 
fullness mode and the full core. If we 
detect the sense exactly with the 
content of determination in which it is 
aimed and if we abstract all the 
differences in the manner of being of 
the modes of effectuation, then we 
have access to a fullness of clarity. In 
this case, there would be a 
coincidence between the description 
of the full core and the description of 
the sense in its fullness mode.  
Such a description occurs 
through the formulation of 
propositions, again the parallelism 
between noema and noese is present 
(§133). The "sense" corresponds to 
"matter" and the unity of sense and 
thetic character to the "proposition". 
There are propositions of a single 
member, as in perceptions, and of 
more than one member, synthetic 
propositions, such as predicative 
doxic (judgments). Propositions of 
pleasure, desire, command, etc. may 
be of one or more members. The task 
is, on the one hand, the search for a 
systematic and universal doctrine of 
the forms of the senses 
(significations), on the other, the 
systematic classification of 
propositions. 
To delineate a systematic 
doctrine of sense-forms or logical 
significations, that is, of predicative 
propositions, of judgments, with a 
universal scope to mark all possible 
kinds of significations in all possible 
operations, is a capital task (§134). A 
true morphology would constitute 
the eidetic and necessary substrate for 
a scientific mathesis universalis, for a 
general morphology of the senses. 
These synthetic forms belong to 
a strict formal system and can be 
extracted by abstraction and fixed in 
conceptual expression. To determine 
all these a priori forms and to 
dominate in systematic completeness 
the configurations of forms, which are 
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of an infinite diversity and yet 
circumscribed by laws, implies the 
idea of a morphology of propositions 
or apophatic syntaxes. 
Husserl explains that positions 
can be doxic modalities, because 
when we conjecture or explain or 
affirm or deny, even assuming 
different forms (“S could be p”, “Is S 
p?”, “S is not p”, “S is p”, “S is 
certainly, effectively p”), what is 
“conjectured”, or what is 
“problematic”, or what is “asserted”, 
or what is “denied” continue to have 
the noematic correlates of these 
different modes of expression. In 
other words, the form is multiply 
determined, however, there is a total 
proposition of which a total thesis is 
part, including in this a doxic thesis. 
That is why every proposition can be 
converted into a proposition of 
statement, in a proposition on the 
modality of the content. Once again 
the correspondence between the 
noetic and the noematic is present, 
between the proposition and the 
sense. 
Thus every thing of nature is 
represented by all senses and 
propositions that are variably 
fulfilled, that is to say, it is 
represented by the multiplicities of 
"full cores", by all possible "subjective 
modes of appearance”, in which it can 
be constituted noematically as 
something similar (§135). Put another 
way, the unity of the thing contrasts 
with the multiplicity of noetic lived, 
all agreeing that they are aware of the 
identical ‘X’. 
Next, Husserl proposes the idea 
of constitution of an object. To 
constitute an object is to bring an 
object to evidence; an object is 
constituted in certain nexuses of 
consciousness evidencing a unity, the 
consciousness of an identical 'X'. It is 
in this context that one can ask about 
effectiveness: is the identity of the 'X' 
intentioned noematically "effective" 
identity? How can all those nexus of 
consciousness make an effective 
object? How does the noetic-noematic 
constitution of objectivities occur? 
Here, we are under the 
jurisdiction of reason that asks about 
effectiveness, conjecture, doubt, and 
resolves the doubt. When one speaks 
of actual, truly existing objects of the 
category of being, the statement that 
describes it "will be true" or "will be 
effective" or "will be rationally 
attestable" if it is in correlation with it. 
This correlation is not empirical, but 
an "ideal" possibility, a possibility of 
essence. Simply put, what is being 
described is the object as pure X, the 
same, the identical, already reduced, 
object of articulated synthesis, the 
content of a nomothetic act. 
Therefore, the correspondence 
between the actual, existing object, 
category of being, and the founded 
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statement, evidenced immediately, is 
a possibility of essence. 
To answer these questions about 
effectiveness, Husserl introduces a 
number of key interdependent 
concepts, they are: originarily 
presentive, “intuitive” mode, 
evidence, and belonging. A positional 
lived event is given in originarily 
presentive mode, for example, 
perceptive acts such as vision, or in 
non-originarily presentive mode such 
as remembering (§136). These 
differences, however, do not affect the 
pure sense of the proposition, for it is 
always identical and intuitive as such 
by consciousness. The difference is in 
how sense, or proposition, requires an 
addition of complementary moments, 
that is, how sense or proposition is 
filled or not filled. Husserl gives an 
example: we see a landscape or we 
remember a landscape. Considering 
the way of filling the sense, in the first 
case, we have the intuitive mode, 
when the sense of the "object as such" 
is brought to consciousness as an 
originarily presentive, “in person”, 
and in the noema corporeity is 
merged into the pure sense. In the 
intuitive mode is a mode of living the 
sense in which the "object as such" is 
brought to consciousness in 
originarily presentiveness. The sense 
is fulfilled. In the second case, of 
remembering, we have the opposite, 
the consciousness of memory is not 
originarily presentive, the landscape 
is not perceived as such, although it 
has its own legitimacy. 
Husserl focuses on perception. 
To any appearing “in person” belongs 
a position. The position is motivated 
by the appearance, that is, the 
position has its originary foundation 
of legitimation in the original data of 
the appearing. In just the same 
manner, the position of essence 
originally given in the seeing of 
essence belongs to the position-
material, to the 'sense'. The position of 
essence is founded in the sense that in 
its turn is founded on the intuition of 
essence in original giving. So, 
consciousness is able to intuit the 
essence, the universal, from the 
experience, from the particular 
phenomenon. Universals are 
transcendent to consciousness 
although they are intuited and 
evidenced transcendentally. 
(Sparrow, 2014, p. 29) 
Make evident is to clarify the 
unity of a rational position with what 
motivates it, is the agreement 
between what is understood and the 
given (§§137-138). To evidence or 
intellectual seeing is a positional, 
doxic and adequately presentive 
consciousness. It is an act of reason. 
We have the evidence derived from 
the apodictic view, as in the case of 
arithmetic, where the data is 
adequate, an evidence of essence, and 
the evidence derived from experience 
as in the example above, seeing a 
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landscape, a weak evidence in which 
the data is inadequate, the 
appearance is incomplete, although 
the sense remains. In this case, the 
task of phenomenology is to bring to 
clarity how consciousness of 
inadequate data relates to a single 
and determinable 'X'. 
A position has its legitimation as 
a position of its sense if it is rational 
and rational character is what 
corresponds to it by essence (§139). At 
the same time, a proposition has its 
legitimation when it is infused with 
the noematic character. Remembering 
that, considering only the doxical 
sphere, all doxic modalities (possible, 
believable, problematic, doubtful, 
etc.) refer to the original doxa, that is, 
they refer to an original rational 
character that forms part of the 
domain of the original belief that in 
turn refers to the original evidence. 
Simply put, all lines flow towards the 
original belief and its original reason, 
which is, the "truth". More than that, 
only the original evidence is an 
"original" source of legitimacy. 
Remembering and empathy, although 
motivated, are imperfect evidences 
that can lead to original evidence only 
in a mediate form. (§§140-141). 
Husserl then presents his 
definition: “Truth is manifestly the 
correlate of the perfect rational 
characteristics pertaining to protodoxa, to 
certainly of belief.” [HUA 3, 290]. 
Therefore, the sentences 'the 
proposition of doxa is true' and 'the 
perfect rational character conforms to 
the belief' are equivalent. To say that 
it is true implies admitting its 
rationality. 
From eidetic understanding of 
truth it is possible to deduce an 
explanation of the eidetic correlation 
between the idea of true being and 
the idea of truth, between the "truly 
existent object" and the "object to be 
rationally put." To do so, the object 
would be given completely with 
respect to the determinable 'X', would 
leave nothing "open". This is because 
the rational thesis must have its basis 
in the original given in the full sense, 
the 'X' aimed at full determination 
and originality. Thus, in principle, 
every "truly existing" object 
corresponds to the idea of a possible 
consciousness, in which the object 
itself is originally apprehensible in 
perfect suitability. 
The possibility of apprehending 
an object is eidetically prescribed by 
its category, whether perfect or 
imperfect, whether complete or 
incomplete, its possibility of 
complementation or fulfillment (§ 
142). The category of the object 
prescribes the general rules of 
evidence for each particular object 
brought to consciousness in 
multiplicities of concrete lived events, 
prescribes the rules of how an object 
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can be brought to determinacy of its 
meaning and mode of giving. The 
determinations of the objects are 
given by apoditic evidence, is the case 
of space objects that are submitted to 
the forms of pure geometry. The 
geometry rule system determines all 
possible motion shapes, but does not 
trace any real singular stroke. The 
transcendent cannot give itself 
adequately, but the idea of something 
transcendent, its sense, its a priori 
rules, yes (§ 144). 
In this sense, the natural 
sciences seek the determination of 
things as units put experimentally; 
phenomenology seeks in the interior 
of nature the univocal determination 
in accordance with the idea of natural 
object. Phenomenology is a new layer 
of research, noetic and noematic, 
which underpins natural sciences. 
Thus, we have the maxim: “what takes 
place in the Eidos functions as an 
absolutely insurmountable norm of the 
fact.” [HUA 3, 301]  
What matters to 
phenomenology is to study the 
continuous unifications of identity in 
all domains, all studies in 
transcendental orientation. The 
configurations of noeses and noemas, 
systematic and eidetic morphologies, 
needs and possibilities of essence, 
forms of unification, eidetic relations 
and laws of essence, in short, the 
object of study is always the 
designation of eidetic nexus and the 
first step is the noematic 'X'. The 
essences are conceived as ideal, 
independently existing, timeless 
universals that can be manifested in 
distinct space-time particulars (Smith 
and McIntyre, 1982, p. 117). For 
example, among the essences of the 
natural world we have 'thing', among 
the essences of the ideal world we 
have 'value' and among the essences 
of the formal world we have 
'number', which phenomenology 
encompasses through eidetic laws 
and reaches from the bond with the 
noematic 'X'. 
Therefore, the possibility of the 
noematic 'X' is not attested only by 
the originarily presentiveness, but 
also by the whole chain that starts 
from it, that is, the open access to 
different levels of universality that 
corroborate reciprocally and 
coherently. Though, from the 
universal given in the lived event, the 
noematic 'X', it is possible to trace all 
the way to the universal in the strict 
sense understood as abstract non-
spatio-temporal property. This is the 
reason why I considered the 
translation of 'Allgemeinheit' to 
universality more accurate then to 
generality. A general idea is derived 
from a process of abstraction, admits 
exception. The universal as intended 
is the result of phenomenological 
reduction, admits no contingency, is 
an abstract property, neither temporal 
nor spacial, a universal in the strict 
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sense. This is the idea of universality 
presented by Husserl in Ideas I.  
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